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A Study on Philippine Exchange Rate Policies*
Joseph Y. Lim'"
Introduction
Since the late 1960s, there has been strong resistance from many quarters against any form of
devaluation, in sharp contrast with the near-unanimous call of economists for a realistic depreciation
of the currency in order to encourage exports, foster economic competitiveness and efficiency, and
avoid perennial balance-of-payment crises.
The diammetrically opposed positions are further polarized today as many in the private sector -
- from big business to militant labor and even small farmers -- consistently oppose devaluation. Their
resistance has silenced policymakers who espoused realistic exchange-rate adjustments. The private
sector sees devaluation as stagflationary: increases in the domestic cost of imports contract output and
aggravate price inflation (e.g. Krugman and Taylor 1978).
Empirical studies incorporating the exchange rate in a supply-side macro model corroborate the
above intuition (see Bautista et al. 1992). This study, however, will try to show that if exchange rates
are fixed, then it would be misleading to use them in macro-supply equations to represent the shadow
exchange rate, or as the measure of the scarcity of foreign exchange. For in a fixed exchange-rate
regime, foreign exchange may be scarce and exchange rates low, so that the exchange rate will not
reflect the true economic cost of foreign-exchange scarcity. It is appropriate in this case to include the
international reserves as a determinant in output supply, particularly when foreign-exchange controls
are implemented (as they usually are) simultaneously with a de facto fixed exchange rate regime.
Stylized Facts from the Philippines
Devaluation should be placed in the context of Philippine history and how the exchange rate
affects key economic variables. Table 1 shows the exchange rate, growth rate of the exchange rate,
growth rate of the agricultural sector, growth rate of the nonagricultural sector, inflation rate based on
both the GDP and CPI deflators and growth rates of exports and imports.
Significant devaluations occurred in 1962, 1970, 1983, and 1984; and more moderate ones in
1975, 1982, 1985, 1986, and 1990. The stylized facts seem to point to different effects on output and
prices. The best effects occurred in 1962: inflation increased in 1963 and 1964 but stayed well within
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2Table 1
Data on Exchange Rate and Other Iqscro Variabtes
GROUTHRATE
Price Index
Exchange Exchange Real Agri- Mon-Agri .................
YEAR Rate Rate GDP culture culture PGDP CP%T2 Export Import
(Level)
1960 2.02
1961 2.02 0.00 5.60 5.87 5.48 2.78 4.66 -10.28 1.16
1962 3.73 84.55 4.78 4.28 5.01 1.87 3.29 10.87 -3.95
1963 3.91 4.90 6.96 6.40 7.20 7.98 8.13 29.60 5.28
1964 3.91 -0.01 3.47 -0.14 5.02 7.20 8.70 2.30 26.21
1965 3.91 0.00 5.24 7.60 4.28 3.18 3.12 3.57 3.59
1966 3.90 -0.14 4.44 3.15 4.99 5.82 4.87 7.65 5.57
1967 3.92 0.49 6.09 7.36 5.57 6.47 5.65 -0.71 24.50
1968 3.93 0.16 5.56 7.12 4.90 4.86 2.02 4.53 8.29
1969 3.93 0.05 4.80 3.08 5.54 4.93 1.40 "0.23 "1.57
1970 6.02 53.22 4.58 2.23 5.57 14.92 15.27 21.51 -3.70
1971 6.43 6.76 4.92 4.91 4.93 12.50 21.41 6.97 8.79
1972 6.67 3.78 4.76 3.77 5.16 6.04 8.20 -2.64 3.68
1973 6.76 1.22 8.66 6.15 9.67 17.80 16.53 70.52 29.85
1974 6.79 0.47 5.26 2.58 6.31 31.83 34.16 44,.49 96.87
1975 7.25 6.78 6.70 4.94 7.36 7.92 6.79 -15.82 10.05
1976 7.44 2.65 8.01 7.98 8.03 9.19 9.17 12.21 5.04
1977 7.40 -0.50 6.15 4.96 6.58 7.38 9.90 22.42 7.74
1978 7.37 -0.50 5.50 4.15 5.99 9.21 7.34 8.70 20.88
1979 7.38 0.16 6.25 4,51 6.87 15.24 17.52 34.34 29.79
1980 7:51 1.81 5.24 4.67 5.43 15.61 18.21 25.80 25.81
1981 7.90 5.17 3.93 4.00 3.91 10.98 13.07 -1.14 2.83
1982 8.54 8.11 2.90 3.13 2.82 8.41 10.24 -12.25 -3.51
1983 11.11 30.13 0.93 -2.10 1.98 11.74 10.02 -0.32 -2.35
1984 16.70 50.27 -6.00 2.27 -8.74 49.69 50.34 7.71 -18.93
1985 18.61 11.43 -4.28 3.32 -7.10 18.44 23.11 -14.13 -15.80
1986 20.39 9.56 1.42 3.27 0.0(5 0.92 0.75 4.60 "1.31
1987 20.57 0.89 4.60 -1.02 6.97 7.98 3.79 18.13 33.58
1988 21.10 2.57 6.37 3.57 7.47 9.60 8.76 23.67 21.11
1989 21.74 3.03 5.64 4.29 6.14 10.57 10,59 10.56 27.69
1990 24.31 11.84 2.54 2.19 2.67 14.23 12.68 4.67 17.16
3the single-digit boundary (partly since inflation started from a low base). Both agricultural and
nonagricultural output rose substantially in 1963. The agricultural sector declined slightly in 1964 due
to floods and storms, but fluctuated between 3 percent to more than 7 percent growth rates in the
succeeding years before the next major devaluation in 1970. The nonagricultural sector's growth
stabilized to around 5% up to 1970 and 1971.
One major reason for the good showing in 1962 and the years immediately after is that the
devaluation in 1962 was done not only to stave off a deteriorating balance-of-payment hemorrhage, but
to implement a new development strategy -- from a protectionist industrialization to liberalization. The
move included not only a devaluation but also import liberalization and tariff reduction. The shift was
the major issue during the presidential election in 1962 when the candidate espousing freer trade and
less protectionist policy won. Thus, the new development strategy, 1 which included devaluation, had
some support from a populace disillusioned with the import-substitution strategy that had resulted in
economic slowdown, balance-of-payments deficits and corruption.
The consensus favoring a new strategy brought vigor to the economy as expectations and
confidence rose. Import liberalization may have cushioned the inflationary pressures by lowering costs
of imported items. Furthermore, because exports were still largely agricultural -- and not industrial
exports dependent on imported inputs -- devaluation pushed exports up. The conducive world
commodity market helped. Exports increased in 1962 and grew by 30% in 1963. Imports fell in 1962
but made a quick comeback in 1964.
The 1970 devaluation was a much more difficult and tumultuous one. A foreign debt payment
problem caused by the construction spending of the Marcos administration sparked yet another balance-
of-payments crisis. Because quotas and tariffs were re-imposed between 1965 and 1969, the devaluation
was not accompanied by policies that could cushion inflation. Devaluation was not part of a new
development package but simply a reaction to the balance-of-payments crisis and a precondition for
receiving more IMF and World Bank loans. The main negative effect was inflation, which for the first
time shot into the mid-teens and twenties in 1970 and 1971, respectively. Output, however, was not
adversely affected as growth rate of GDP was maintained at slightly less than 5 %. Agricultural growth
fell in 1970 due again to massive floods and typhoons, but exports grew heftily in 1970 as imports fell.
(This increase in exports was not however sustained in 1971 and 1972).
Inflation, the highest ever, caused great social unrest and contributed to the growing
radicalization of the student populace which would lead to the declaration of martial law in 1972. It
also contributed to the strong belief tt_at exists today that devaluation means economic upheaval and
instability.
Perhaps the most painful experience with devaluation is in 1983 and 1984 during the biggest
economic collapse the country has ever faced. When medium and long term loans virtually ceased in
1982 when Mexico and Brazil defaulted on their loans, balance of payments turned awry and there was
again tremendous pressures for devaluation which ocurred in both late 1982 and mid-1983. When the
Aquino assassination occurred in August 1983, political and economic instability intensified the massive
1Many of the policies instituted then were however reversd in the mid and late 1960s.
4capital flight that had been going on since 1981. The crisis gave rise to further pressure for
devaluation, which occurred in April 1984. Pressures for devaluation continued and the currency
depreciated moderately up to April 1984.
Shortly after the major devaluations, the government, partly to stem the capital outflows and
partly to implement an austere and belt-tightening IMF program, slashed government (non-debt related)
expenditures and released high-yielding Central Bank bills to mop up liquidity and reduce credit. The
result was an interest rate ranging from 40 to 60 % and the complete unavailability of credit from banks,
and inflation that soared to 50% in 1984 and more than 20% (in terms of CPI) in 1985. Output
stagnated in 1983 and fell by a whalloping 6% in 1984 and more than 4% in 1984 and 1985. Imports
declined by 19% and 16% in the same years. Exports stagnated and even declined by 14% in 1985.
The reason for the stagflation is clear. Devaluation became part and parcel, not of a trade and
industrial policy as it should, but an austerity program designed to stem the foreign reserves and the
balance of payments hemorrhage. No wonder then that output declined and inflation accelerated. The
exchange rate adjustments to market level were done only when extreme balance-of-payments problems
arose. Thus the exchange rate reflects its real shadow price only in extreme crises; otherwise, it is
stable. The unusual experience of the mid-1980s contributes to the popular misconception that
devaluations cause economic crises.
Finally, it must be pointed out that with the advent of the foreign debt overhang, the exchange
rate becomes crucially linked to the foreign debt service of the govenment (which has assumed most
private debt of failed companies), and therefore also linked to the monetary and financial sector. The
delinking of the exchange rate to trade and industrial policy and its linking to financial flows has been
detrimental for it has brought about a dichotomy between exchange rate policies and trade and industrial
policies (such as investment incentive schemes and import liberalization).
The Maeroeconometric Model
Given the above considerations, a simple macroeconometric model will accomodate some of the
factors described above and allow for the study of the effects of exchange rate changes on both the
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
:The:model assumes supply- side restrictions in the real sector (made up of the agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors). This is particularly acceptable for the Philippines for production bottlenecks,
such:as:: poor infrastructure, limited foreign exchange reserves and credit unavailability (due to high
interest rate policies) constrain the output of the economy. We also adopt the new structuralist view
which assumes that loans are advanced in the beginning of the production period and that bank loans
are cruciat dueto the absence of sophisticated equities and stock markets.
ThesupplyAed assumption also allows concentration on the exchange rate, which is basically an
incentive or supply-side price variable. It also avoids the problem of possible divergence in the
simulation if weinc!ude .adernand sec:tor and force the price variable to equate the supply and demand
equations. The price variable is estimated using a reduced form equation for its growth rate, which
includes both demand and supply factors.
The supply equations assume that the production (agricultural and non-agricultural) sectors follow
traditional production functions for labor, intermediate imported inputs and capital stock. Profit
maximization yields the following supply functions:
Yi = f((W/P.j(I+r),(eP_*/P._(I+r),K) (I)
i = a,na
where the first two elements in the parenthesis denote the real cost of labor and imported input
respectively. Real wage and real cost of imported inputs are multiplied by (1 +r) following the new
structuralist theory that interest cost for working capital should be included in the supply function.
Capital stock is assumed fixed in the short run and is not affected by real cost of capital. Now because
of credit rationing due to financial repression (restrictive interest policies) before 1981 and mopping up
liquidity by selling treasury bills at high rates throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, a quantity variable
for credit is included in lieu of r. This yields the supply function used in our regressions, which is:
Y_ = f (W/P_, (eP_)/P_, TL/P_, GIR, K, t) (2)
i = a, na
where TL is domestic credit (measured by total liquidity or M3).
Similarly, inasmuch as the exchange rate is restricted due to Central Bank interventions, the
actual exchange rate does not capture the shadow price of foreign exchange and fails to measure the
scarcity of foreign exchange. It captures only the relative cost of imports for privileged agents with
access to rationed foreign exchange traded at the lower exchange rate. Its quantity variable, gross
international reserves (inclusive of gold) - GIR - is therefore included in the equation.
The average tariff rate (crudely measured as the ratio of import tax revenues over total value of
merchandise imports) is also included as a regressor. One reason is that it increases the domestic cost
of imported inputs. But we separate it from this regressor since tariff rates also reflect degree of
protection and may have separate (dis)incentive effects on output.
The equations of our model -- regression equations as well as identities -- are shown in Table
2. The first equation states that agricultural value-added in 1972 prices is a positive function of real
wages, gross international reserves, capital stock and number of hectares of irrigated land during the
dry season. It is a negative function of real domestic cost of imports and the average tariff rate. The
equation also assumes first degree autocorrelation (AR(1) =-.4182 denotes the first-order autocorrelation
coefficient) since the Durbin-Watson statistic showed some evidence of autocorrelation. The result
wherein real wages seem to be positively correlated with agricultural value-added indicates that the
demand factors that relate real wages to agricultural output is stronger than the supply-side effects of
real wages.
The second equation states that non-agricultural value-added in 1972 prices is a positive function
of real amount of available credit, gross international reserves, capital stock and a negative function of
average tariff rate. It is negatively related to a dummy variable for 1986, the year when pump-priming
(a h_igh TL/P and GIR) failed to increase output sufficiently due to lack of confidence in the system
(1986, the year following the two most turbulent years when GDP crashed, witnessed both the EDSA
6Table 2
EClUations and VariabLes of the Model
1. Ya = 8878.5062 + 79.7357 _J/Pa - 12.6548 eP;/P a + 0.2144 GIR + .0458 K - 18685.?9 t + 0.0127 IRRD + JAR(l) -- -0.4182]
(5.9853)* (4.8788)* (-3.0303)** (1.9543)**" (11.0146)* (-3.4461)* (5.5002)* (-1.3416)
R2= .9982 F = 386.52*
2. Yna = 19995.696 + 1.1583 TL/P + 2.0283 GIR + 0.0929 K - 42389.67 t - 5394.516 DUM66
(2.9097)** (10.1906)* (4.3066)* (6.9762)* (-I.7243) (-3.9315)*
R2 = .9840
DW = 1.84 F =98.46*
3. Y = Ya + Yna
4. X$a = -2107.5908 + 4354.8555 eP_/Pd - 7045.5388 t - 330.6406 DUMB586 + 0.4851 (XSa)_I
(-4.1584)* (5.3518)* (-2.5699)** (-3.1683)* (4.2194)*
R2:.9313 F = 30.49**
H-test is not applicable 1
5. XSna = 2977.3188 - 58.7339 ePm/eP x + .0764 TL/P + 0.0243 K + 0.5395 G[R - 11182.42 t - 998.3889 DUMB6
(1.2305) (-5.7129)* (2.2647)** (6.0587)* (3.5889)* (-1.5119) (-2.4446)**
R2 = .9815
DW : 1.86 F = 61.72"
6. X$ = X$a  XSna
_r
7. Xa = eXSa/eP x
8. Xna = eX$na/eP* x
1H-test is used to test autocorreLation in equations with tagged dependent variable as regressor. In such
equation the Durbin-gatson statistic cannot be used.
79. _ = Xa Xna
10. X = 10467.78  0.8505[ + JAR(l) = 0.8558]
(1.2266) (3.1495)* (4.8652)*
R2 = .9454 F=86.54"
11. Ip = -3349.4068 + 0.3749 TL/P + 2.6906 Ig + 0.5784 GIR * 2636.4588 DUM8486
(-1.0035) (3.4025)* (11.4713)* (1.3250) (-2.7564)**
R2 = .9745
DW= 1.81 F = 85.86*
P - (X/Y) eP:
12. Pd =
1 - X/Y
P - (Ya/Y) Pa
13. Pna=
1 - Ya/Y
14. Pa/Pna= 195.9804 - 0.0006526 Y - 127.2011 Ya/Yna+ _R(1) = .3825]
(4.6468)* (-2.1716)** (-1.9159)*** (1.1257)
R2 = .7255 F = 7.93***
15. PI = *9.3224 + 1.1188 P + [AR(1) = .5927]
ttt
(-.406) (34.5520) (2.1490)
R2 = .9982 F = 2780.658*
16. P = 7.5953+ 0.4458W + 0.2007 ePm - 0.5526 (T_/P)+ 0.4401Y o 4.3718DUMB687
(3.1924)* (5.2170)* (1.7909) (-3,9374)* (1.5815) (-2.0899)***
R2 = .9747
DW_ 1.97 F = 61.59"
17. P = P.I+ PP_I
8A
18. u = (u - u.1)/W.1*100
^* ; _ *19. ePm = (eP - (ePm)_l)/(eP__l* 100
20. (T_/P) = (TL/P - (TL/P)_I)/(TL/P). _ 100
21. M$C = -133.7838 0.9322 (l+t)eP;  1,1569Pd + 0.0056 Y
(-0.5395) (-4,3643)* (5.4392)* (2,0037)***
R2 = .9197
DU = 2,88 F = 38,18"
22. M$1 = -10994.619 - 801.3979 DUMB6 - 4.5525 (l+t)eP_ + 4.2134 P + 0.1861Y
(-5.7672)* (-1.5170) (-2.6189)** (2.3910)** (8.5635)*
R2 = .9621
DW = 1.66 F = 57,18"
23. M$K = -997.8637 + 0.0719 I - 1.2238 (1+t)eP;  2.0133PI
(-2.6307)** (6.8751)* (oi.8195)*** (4.1744)*
R2 = .9043
DW = 1.51 F = 31.50*
24. MS = M$C + MS1+ M$K
25. M = eM$
26- Timp= tM
27. Tdir= -16274.758 + 0.0563 PY + JAR(1) = 0.8213]
(-1.0404) (4.4813)* (3.8985)*
R2 = .9766
H = F = 209.04*
28. Tind = -3517.1137 + .0455 PY
(-2.3505)** (18.1184)*
R2 = .9650
DW = 1.51 F = 330.53"
29. R = Timp + Tdir  Tind+ Tothers
30. Pl[g = 3319.8101 + 0.1118 FS - 4686.4729 DU_586  0.6041(Pl|g)-I
(2.3197)** (3.3269)* (-3.9412)* (4.0501)*
R2 = .9573
H ; -0.4847 F = 74.81"
31. GOd = -1337.9493  0.4493CPSO.I+ 0.9647 (GOd)-1
('0.4272) (1.8693)*** (6.1505)*
R2 = .9287 r = 71.67"
H-test is not applicable
32. GOf = eC4)$f
33. CPSD = DEFg  GOCCdeficits + CB deficits + Gothers
34. DEFg = _PY
35. FS = R + DEFg " GO
36. C._ = GOd + GDf
37. GIR = GIR_I+ X$ - MS + Eothers
38. dGIR = GIR - GIR- 1
39. dHB = 3103.0313 + 1.9360 dGIR + 0.2712 CPSD * 147.28801P + 12787.564 0UH89
(2.4503)** (116157) (5.5167)* (-211572)** (4.3203)*
R2 = .9070
DW = 2.28 F = 21.93"*
40. HB = HB-I+ CI'IB
41. TL = 10021.98 + 1.01185 HB - 13628.967 0UN8687 + 0.7301TL. 1
(2.2217)** (3.9712)* (-3.5469)* (5.7901)*
R2 = .9968 F = 1045.51"
H-test is not applicable
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42. ged = Pd- (°Pro +'OPx)l(° + G) + (Pro + Px)I(° + O) _I(o + n)
43. _ = MSlXS
44. _'= (_l- ;._i);t_i*100
45. ed = e_1+ (e_1)ged
46. deal= ed - e_1
47. de ---0,0611 + 0.3818 ded + 3.4435 DUMB384 + EAR(1) = -.4063]
(-0.2964) (4.8541)* (7.5716)* (-1.3285)
R2 = .8493
H = F = 18.79 ***
48. e = e_l+ de
49. i = Ip + lg
50. K = (I - 0.354558) K_I+ 1_1
Er_kxjerx3usVari_Les
Ya Value-added of agricultural sector (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
Yna Value-added of non-agricultural sector (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
Y Gross domestic product, GDP (in mitt{on pesos, 1972 prices)
Growth rate of GDP
X$ a Dollar value of agricultural merchandise exports (in million dollars)
X$na Dollar value of non-agricultural merchandise exports (in million dollars)
X$ Total merchandise exports (in million dollars)
Xa Real value of agricultural exports (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
Xna Real value of non-agricultural exports (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
Total merchandise exports (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
X Total exports of goods and sevice in the national account (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
]p Private investments (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
lg Government construction (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
11
I Total investment (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
• Pa Price index for agriculture (1972 base year)
Pna Price index for non-agriculture (1972 base year)
Pd Price index of domestic goods (1972 base year)
eP; Peso price index of imports (1972 base year)
ePx Peso price index of exports (1972 base year)
PI Price index for investment (1972 base year)
P GDP price deflator (1972 base year)
A
Pd Growth rate of the price index of domestic goods
ePm Growth rate of the peso price index of imports
Inflation rate (COP price deflator, 1972 base year)
Growth rate of wages for unskilled workers
MSc Imports of consomor and other durable goods (in million dollars)
MSI Imports of intermediate goods (in million dollars)
M$K Imports of capita[ goods (in million dollars)
N$ Total merchandise imports (in million dollars)
M Nominal value of imports (in million pesos)
Tim p Tariffs and import taxes (in million pesos)
Tdi r Income and property taxes (in million pesos)
Tin d Excise and sale taxes (in million pesos)
R Total government revenue (in million pesos)
TL Total Liquidity (M3, in million pesos)
T_/P Growth rate of real total liquidity (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
GIR Gross international reserves (in million dollars)
dGIR Changein gross international reserves (in million dollars)
HB Monetary base (in million pesos)
dMB Change in monetary base (in million pesos)
K Capital Stock
12
GDd Government payments for domestic debt (in million pesos)
GDf Government payments for foreign debt (in million pesos)
GO Total government debt payments (in million pesos)
CPSD Consolidated public sector deficit (in million pesos)
FS Total government revenue plus national government deficit less
government interest payments (in million pesos)
DEFg National government deficit (in million pesos)
e Nominal exchange rate (average for the peried)
ed Desired exchange rate
ded Desired change in exchange rate
de Actual change in exchange rate
Ratio of exports to in_oorts
Growth rate of exports to in_oorts ratio
Exogenous Variables
IRRD Irrigated land, dry season (in hectares)
P_ Dollar price index of imports (1972 base year)
Px Dollar pri"ce index of exports (1972 base year)
Pm Growth rate of the dollar price index of imports
Px Growth rate of the dollar price index of exports
Tothers Other taxes (in million pesos)
W Wage index for unskilled workers (1972 base year)
GDSf Foreign interest payment (in million dollars)
GOCC deficits Government-owned corporations' deficits (in million, pesos)
CB deficits Central Bank deficits (in million pesos)
Gothers Other public sector deficits (in million pesos)
National.government deficit to GDP ratio
13
t Ratio of tariffs and import taxes on imports
Eothers Other gross international reserves components(in million pesos)
DUMB6 Dummyfor 1986
DUM89 Dummyfor 1989
DUN8384 Dummyfor 1983 and 1984
DUMB486 Ounwy for 1984 to 1986
DUH8586 Dummyfor 1985 and 1986
DUM8687 Dummyfor 1986 and 1987
14
revolution and the first coup attempt against the Aquino government). Real wages and real domestic
cost of imports have very insignificant coefficients when the other variables are included. The
non-agricultural sector is more dependent on formal credit and international reserves rather than on real
domestic cost of imports pointing to the possibility that the non-agricultural sector is more dependent
on imported inputs. Imports from this sector are more inelastic to import prices and output more
dependent on the level of international reserves. It also seems that the agricultural sector is affected
more adversely by rises in average tariff rates than the non-agricultural sector, although both are
negatively affected: this is to be expected as high tariff rates increase the distortions of relative prices
against the agricultural sector.
The third equation is the accounting identity where real GDP is the sum of agricultural and
non-agricultural value-added. The fourth equation concerns agricultural exports (in dollars) which are
positively affected by the domestic price of exports vis-a-vis the price for domestic non-export output
(P,t) and by past agricultural exports. They are negatively related to the average tariff rate and to a
dummy for the recession years 1985 and 1986. These were the years when export production had been
adversely affected by unstable economic conditions, high interest rates and cutbacks in infrastructure
spending and maintenance. The standard equation (2) in the text does not to apply to agricultural
exports since these are not very dependent on formal credit and imported inputs.
Equation 5 shows non-agricultural merchandise exports (in dollars), to be highly and positively
related to capital stock, international reserves (since non- agricultural exports are also quite
import-dependent) and real value of domestic credit. They are negatively and highly related to the real
cost of imports (relative to domestic export prices) and also negatively related to the average tariff rate
and a dummy for 1986. (As in equation 2, production of non-agricultural exports failed to increase in
1986, even with increases in real credit and international reserves, due to the confidence factor.)
Equations 7, 8 and 9 simply translate exports in dollar terms to exports in constant 1972 pesos.
Equation 10 is a "bridge" equation that translates the exports in pesos in equation 9 (which is based on
the foreign trade statistics) with the exports used in the national income accounts.
Equation 11 is for the private investments that are positively related to real credit available and
significantly and positively related to government investments (mainly government construction),
creating a crowding-in effect. Private investments are negatively related to the real cost of imported
inputs (inclusive of the average tariff rate) and positively but not significantly related to gross
international reserves. Finally, private investments are negatively related to a dummy variable for the
recession years 1984 to 1986.
Equations 12 and 13 are for the price of domestic (non-exported) goods and the price for the
non-agricultural sector. (These equations give approximately the same results assuming Cobb-Douglas
functions of P on Pd and eP_,and P on P, and P_). Equation 14 estimates the ratio of the agricultural
price to the non-agricultural price. Althoughthe t-values are not significant at the 10% level, the
equation indicates that the relative price of agriculture to non-agriculture declines as output goes up
reflecting perhaps increased demand for non-agricull:ural goods as income increases. The ratio is
inversely related to the ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural output: the scarcer agricultural goods are
relative to non-agricultural goods, the higher the price ratio of agricultural to non-agricultural products.)
15
Equation 15 translates the GDP price index to the price index for investment goods, which is
used in the private investment equation (equation 11).
Equation 16 gives us the price inflation equation using the GDP price deflator. Both supply side
factors (those in equation (2) of the text) and demand factors were used as regressors. The result shows
that growth rate in wages as well as 8rowth rate in domestic cost of imports affect price inflation
positively. Instead of one variable ((TI_TP) - S0 to measure growth rate in real credit over and beyond
growth in output, I separated the two variables to interprete data more broadly. Surprisingly, the
results yield opposite signs from those that which the quantity theory of money would have predicted.
Instead growth in real credit is negatively related and growth in real GDP is positively related to price
inflation. The explanation uses the supply-led model: the inflationary effect of credit contraction due
to high interest rate or shortage of financial credit is stronger than the deflationary effect of money
supply contraction via the quantity theory of money. Growth of real GDP is usually accompanied by
higher inflation as capacity utilization increases. Finally, a dummy variable for 1986 and 1987, the
years preceded by the sharpest declines in output in recent history. Capacity utilization during these
two years therefore was low, and pump-priming and recovery were, therefore, accompanied by
unusually low inflation.
Equation 17 calculates the GDP price deflator from its past level and the current inflation rate.
Equation 18 computes wage inflation. Our model assumes wage or wage inflation to be exogenous
since regressions for wage-inflation based on past inflation or regressions for real wage based on a
desired level of real wage yielded poor results. Equations 19 and 20 simply contain the growth rate for
domestic cost of imports and total real liquidity, respectively.
Equations 21 to 23 concern imports. Consumer good imports (in dollars) are positively related
to real GDP and the price of domestic non-export goods, but negatively related to the domestic cost of
imports, inclusive of tariffs and import taxes. Imports for raw materials and intermediate products (in
dollars) are positively related to real GDP and the GDP price deflator but negatively related to the
domestic cost of imports, inclusive of tariffs and import taxes. A dummy variable is included for 1986
when imports of intermediate products were much lower than usual although international reserves were
high due to the high inventory of intermediate goods following the two years of economic collapse.
Imports of capital goods (in dollar terms) are positively related to the level of real investments and the
price of investment goods, but negatively related to the domestic cost of imports inclusive of tariffs and
import taxes.
Equation 24 sums up the total values of the three different types of inputs and equation 25
converts imports from dollars to current peso.
Equation 26 gives the tax revenue based on tariffs and other import taxes. It is simply the
average tariff rate multiplied by imports in current peso. The average tariff rate is assumed exogenous.
Equations 27 and 28 give direct as well as excise and sales taxes respectively; both are regressed to
nominal GDP. Equation 27 gives autoregressive error terms and the first-degree autocorrelation
estimates. Equation 29 gives total government revenue; other revenues include non-tax revenues.
Equation 30 gives us the estimate of the government investments, which is assumed to be
positively related to fiscal money not meant for debt service and past levels of infrastructure outlays.
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The dummy for 1985 and 1986 is included because the two years saw demand contraction and
economic recession. The figure (translated into real terms) is used in the private investment equation
(equation 11).
Equation 31 gives the domestic debt service which is assumed to be a function of the previous
period's consolidated public sector deficit and the level of past domestic-debt service. The national
government deficit is largely financed by domestic borrowings, and the Central Bank deficits, inasmuch
as they are monetized, lead to mopping up operations through issuance of T-bills. Equation 32
computes payments for the government's foreign debt. The dollar equivalent of foreign debt payments
is assumed to be exogenous.
Equation 33 gives us the identity for theconsolidated public sector deficits, which is made up
of the national government deficit, deficits of government-owned corporations, the Central Bank deficits
and other items (such as Oil Price Stabilization Fund). Equation 34 gives us the national government
deficit as a percentage of nominal GDP. Our model assumes that this percentage (_-)is exogenous and
the government has restricted itself beforehand to this ratio. Equation 35 computes available
government fund after debt service. FS is defined as total government revenue plus the national
government deficit less payments for the debt service. Equation 36 sums up the government's domestic
and foreign debt service payments.
Equation 37 tens us that gross international reserves is made up of its past level plus the trade
surplus plus exogenous changes in the reserve position (mainly from the capital account). Equation 38
simply gives us the first difference or change in the gross international reserve level.
Equation 39 shows that changes in the monetary base are affected by the consolidated public
sector deficits (the most significant variable) through the Central Bank deficits as well as government
payment of short term treasury bills used to finance the deficit. The monetary base is also positively
affected by changes in the gross international reserves; as a policy variable, it is negatively affected
by past inflation because authorities try to reduce the inflation by restricting the monetary base. The
increase in monetary base was also unusually high in 1989 due to the unusually high monetization of
public sector deficit. (A dummy for that year is included). Total liquidity is a function of the monetary
base and its past value (equation 41). The money multiplier was lower than usual in 1986 and 1987
because of the excruciating rehabilitation of financial institutions necessary to undo the harm of the
previous two year financial collapse.
Equation 42 is the Devarajan measure for the desired rate of change of the exchange rate. The
equation shows that the growth rate of the exchange rate should exceed the growth rate for the price
for domestic goods in order to correct for world price changes (the second term), for changes in the
terms of trade (the third term) and for trade balance changes (the fourth term). For the fourth term it
is assumed that a deterioration in the trade balance is not backed up by capital inflows and therefore the
exchange rate should adjust to stem the foreign exchange outflows, a is the elasticity of substitution
in demand between domestic goods and imported goods. A simple regression assuming a CET function
between imports and domestic goods yielded a a around .87 (see Appendix A). fl is the elasticity of
transformation in supply between exports and domestic goods. A simple regression assuming a CES
function between exports and domestic goods yielded an elasticity of transformation of 1.12 for
equation 42 (see Appendix A). Equation 45 computes the desired change in the exchange rate.
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Equation 47 assumes that the change in the exchange rate is a function of the desired rate of change.
A dummy captures the capital flight phenomenon in 1983 and 1984 which required much greater
devaluation than usual. In estimating actual exchange rate, a further restriction is made: it is assumed
that in nominal terms, the exchange rate will not fall through time; the assumption is plausible for a
highly indebted country, where an appreciation of the currency in nominal terms is highly impossible.
Thus, if the Devarajan equation yields a fall in the desired exchange rate from the previous year's actual
exchange rate, it is asssumed that it is due to highly temporary factors, and that the actual exchange rate
is maintained for the year.
Equation 49 calculates total real investments from private and government investments. Finally,
capital stock (equation 50) is assumed to be the previous capital stock less depreciation p!us last year's
real investments. The capital consumption allowance in the national income accounts is rather stable
and hovers around 3.55 % of previous capital stock.
This study examines exchange rate effects by looking at its impacts on production sectors through
the domestic cost of imports, the resulting gross international reserves and through the effective value
of exports. It can also study the effects of exchange rate changes in the fiscal balance (through the
import taxes and government foreign debt payment) and in the monetary sector which also directly
affects the production sectors.
Simulation Runs
The regressions were done for 1977 to 1990 as fiscal data are consistent only starting 1976.
Two-stage least-squares estimation was used (see Table 2).
A base-run simulation of the model was done for 1987 to 1990. Table 3 lists the actual figures
and the base-run simulated estimates. (The base-run estimates are derived assuming actual exogenous
values for 1987 to 1990 and using the model's equations to estimate the endogenous variables. The
simulation is dynamic. Constant adjustments of $200 million and $300 million were made for
agricultural and non-agricultural exports, respex vely. The results are reasonable. Major errors lie in
estimates for agricultural exports which overest; rate the total value for 1989 and 1990. (Agricultural
exports in the world market are volatile.) Imports for 1988 are overestimated. These two errors lead
to an overestimation of the trade deficit in 1988 and its underestimation for 1989 and 1990. Estimates
for gross international reserves reflect the same error: reserves for 1988 are underestimated while those
for 1989 and 1990 are overestimated; price inflation for 1988 is underestimated while that for 1989
overestimated; GDP growth rate for 1989 is slightly underestimated while that for 1990 is
overestimated.
We now simulate the Devarajan model, allowing the exchange rate to adjust fully in the market:
the exchange rate is set exactly equal to the desired exchange rate as given in the Devarajan equation,
with the stipulation that the currency does not appreciate in nominal terms (see Table 3). The simulated
exchange rate estimates differ significantly from their base run figures for the years 1989 and 1990.
The results of this simulation are as follows:
1. Output would have increased more if exchange rates had been allowed to adjust fully according
to the Devarajan model, especially in 1989 and 1990 when growth rates could have been higher
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Tabte 3
Base Run Simulation and Oevatuation Scenario
for 1987 to 1990
Actua[ Base Run % Diff Base Run Simutated % Diff
Devatuation
.........................................
.........................................
Ya
1987 26834 26662 -0.64 26662 26640 -0.08
1988 27793 27557 -0.85 27557 27631 0.27
1989 28986 28638 -1.20 28638 28764 0.44
1990 29620 29306 -1.06 29306 29814 1.73
Yna
1987 68537 68206 -0.48 68206 68717 0.75
1988 73657 73504 -0.21 73504 74817 1.79
1989 78182 77312 -1.11 77312 80779 4.48
1990 80270 80764 0.62 80764 89519 10.84
.........................................
.........................................
Y
1987 95371 94868 -0.53 94868 95358 0.52
1988 101450 101061 -0.38 101061 102448 1.37
1989 107168 105951 -1.14 105951 109543 3.39
1990 109890 110070 0.16 110070 119333 8.42
1987 4.60 4.04 -12.01 4.04 4.58 13.29
1988 6.37 6.53 2.42 6.53 7.44 13.90
1989 5.64 4.84 -14.15 4.84 6.93 43.13
1990 2.54 3.89 53.05 3.89 8.94 129.89
.........................................
.........................................
Ip
1987 11284 12079 7.05 12079 12187 0.89
1988 13627 13864 1.74 13864 14289 3.07
1989 15754 15423 -2.10 15423 16433 6.55
1990 15700 16260 3.57 16260 18997 16.83
_=_===:=_=====_== =======================
Ig
1987 2290 2278 -0.53 2278 2267 -0.47
1988 2299 2557 11.20 2557 2578 0.84
1989 2529 2646 4.61 2646 2673 1.04
1990 2501 2710 8.34 2710 2843 4.91
l
1987 13574 14357 5.77 14357 14454 0.67
1988 15926 16421 3.11 16421 16867 2.72
1989 18283 18068 =1.17 18068 19106 5.74
1990 18201 18969 4.22 18969 21839 15.13
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Actuat Base Run % Diff Base Run Simulated _ Diff
Devatuation
_===========_==== =======================
E
1987 20.57 20.32 -1.23 20.32 21.11 3.91
1988 21.10 20.45 _3.07 20.45 21.11 3.23
1989 21.74 22.32 2.71 22.32 25.76 15.37
1990 24.31 24,87 2.30 24.87 32,75 31.67
========_======== =======================
X$a
1987 1396 1327 -4.94 1327 1451 9.33
1988 1484 1613 8.69 1613 1766 9.46
1989 1153 1599 38.71 1599 2167 35.51
1990 1063 1297 22.01 1297 2409 85.75
.......................
.......................
X$na
1987 4324 4433 2.52 4433 4617 4.16
1988 5590 5882 5.23 5882 6253 6.30
1989 6668 6899 3.46 6899 8017 16.21
1990 7123 7237 1.60 7237 9959 37,61
=_========_====_ =======================
X$
1987 5720 5760 0.70 5760 6068 5.35
1988 7074 7495 5.96 7495 8018 6.98
1989 7821 8498 8.66 8498 10184 19.84
1990 8186 8534 4.25 8534 12368 44,92
.......................
.......................
MS
1987 6737 6633 -1.55 6633 6570 -0.95
1988 8159 8962 9.84 8962 9160 2.21
1989 10419 10531 1.08 10531 10745 2.03
1990 12206 11867 -2.78 11867 12653 6.63
==_=====_=======_ =======================
X$-M$
1987 -1017 -873 -14.20 -873 -502 -42.51
1988 -I085 -1467 35.14 -1467 -1142 -22.14
1989 -2598 -2033 -21.74 -2033 -561 -72.41
1990 -4020 -3333 -17.11 °3333 -285 -91.44
.......................
.......................
GIR
1987 1959 2103 7.37 2103 2474 17.64
1988 2059 1822 -11.51 1822 2518 38.19
1989 2324 2652 14.10 2652 4820 81.76
1990 1993 3008 50.94 3008 8224 173.35
.......................
.......................
2O
Actual Base Run _ Diff Base Run Simulated X Diff
Devaluation
MB
1987 57738 58430 1.20 58430 59239 1.58
1988 67282 67620 0.50 67620 68990 2.03
1989 92876 94902 2.18 94902 99644 5.00
1990 108721 111220 2.30 111220 123417 10.97
TL
1987 161824 160887 -0.58 160887 161705 0.51
1988 198409 195907 -1.26 195907 197890 1.01
1989 253921 249080 -1.91 249080 255326 2.51
1990 300541 304413 1.29 304413 321315 5.55
x_zz_z_ z_z_ .......................E
TL/P
1987 21789 21560 -I.05 21560 21352 -0.96
1988 24375 24755 1.56 24755 24662 °0.37
1989 28213 26992 -4.33 26992 26145 -3.14
1990 29233 28216 -3.48 28216 26517 -6.02
.........................................
.........................................
1987 7.98 8.49 6.41 8.49 10.11 19.01
1988 9.60 6.05 -36.95 6.05 5,95 +1.67
1989 10.57 16.60 57.17 16.60 21.71 30.7"=3
1990 14.23 16.91 18.83 16.91 24.08 42.37
R
1987 103214 98265 +4,79 98265 100453 2.23
1988 112861 117345 3.97 117345 121078 3.18
1989 152410 155489 2.02 155489 171913 10.56
1990 180841 182365 0.84 182365 227125 24.54
CPSD
1987 18900 18889 -0.06 18889 19225 1.78
1988 29800 29067 +2.46 29067 29693 2.15
1989 39100 39367 0.68 39367 41235 4.74
1990 53300 55199 3.56 55199 63709 15.42
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by 2 and 5 percentage points, respectively. The higher growth is mainly due to higher gross
international reserves position brought about by lower trade deficits, which occured in 1989 and
1990. Lower trade deficits are due to high increases in both agriculture and non-agriculture
exports and to low increases in imports due to their higher costs. Imports, however, continue
to increase as output increases. The non-agricultural sector output increases much more than
the agricultural sector's largely due to the inelastic nature of imports, which makes the sector
dependent on gross international reserves. Agricultural and non-agricultural exports both
increase, although the percentage of agricultural exports increases.
2. Inflation increases significantly especially when exchange rate adjustments are high (as
they were 1989 and 1990). Higher inflation is a result of higher domestic cost of imports caused
by the peso's devaluation.
3. Inflation then causes a fall in real credit which, however, is not substantial due to an increase
in the monetary base and total liquidity (in nominal terms) inasmuch as increases in gross
international reserves also increase monetary base (equation 39 in Table 2). Thus assuming the
authorities do not intervene, the fall in real credit is more than offset by the increase in
gross international reserves, which effects a net increase in output supply. Depending on the
timing of the devaluation, fiscal and monetary policy may enhance growth without aggravating
inflation. For example, if the economy is recovering from a recession, then a devaluation can
be accompanied by reasonably higher fiscal and monetary expansion to increase growth without
setting off an inflationary spiral. If the devaluation is implemented in a period of high
capacity utilization, then there would be less room to maneuver with fiscal and monetary
expansion.
4. A devaluation may increase government expenditure by increasing the foreign debt service. On
the other hand, revenues may increase due to the higher output and higher peso value of
imports, which translate into higher import taxes. The simulation shows that although
consolidated public sector deficit increase nominally, it is less than the increase in revenues.
In our model, where public sector deficits are determined by an exogenously determined
permissible percentage of nominal GDP, there is more allowable spending for governmnent
investments. In our simulation, the increase in nominal public investments also translates to
slightly higher real government investments, which means that the increase in nominal public
investments is more than the increase in prices. Partly because of this, but mainly because of
higher international reserves, private investments, and therefore total (real) investments increase
even if real credit has fallen slightly.
A further set of simulations was done from 1991 to 1993. In the base-run simulation, estimates
for 1991 are compared to the actual values. For 1992 to 1993, exogenous values of 1991 were used
except for growth rate in wages, the exogenous portion of changes in gross international reserves (i.e.
the portion in changes in international reserves not due to the trade deficit) and the predetermined
national government deficit to nominal GDP ratio. Growth rate in wages are assumed to be 10% in
1992 and 1993 (down from 16%). The downward movement in the growth in wages is due to the
recession in 1992 and temporary "taming" of the inflation rate. The exogenous portion of changes in
international reserves is assumed to have gone down from $ 5688.22 million in 1990 to $ 3689.14
million in 1991 due to the expected cutbacks in foreign inflows partly because of the termination of the
22
US-RP Military Bases Agreement. The ratio of national government to GDP is assumed to increase
to 3% in 1992 and 1993 from a low of 2% in 1991. The recession dummies were turned on for both
1991 and 1992 (see Table 4). The forecasts for 1992 and 1993 show sluggish growth (1.76% and
3.53%, respectively), a continuation of the early 1990's pattern. Price inflation falls in 1992 to the
single digit level and increases slightly to less than 11% in 1993. Real levels of credit remain stagnant
between 1991 and 1993. Gross international reserves are high for 1991 and 1992 but fall substantially
in 1993. Real investments are quite overestimated in 1991 and increases moderately in 1992 and 1993.
In another simulation, the exchange rate adjusts fully to the desired level of the Devarajan model
(see Table 4). The results are similar to the previous policy simulation for 1987 to 1990: the exchange
rate goes up by almost 20% in 1993; devaluation results in higher output growth rate especially for 1993
when growth rate rises from 3.53% in the base run to 5.85%. The increase was mainly due to the
increase in gross international reserves brought about by higher exports. Increases in 1993 output are
mainly concentrated on the non-agricultural sector; although both agricultural and non-agricultural
exports increased significantly with agricultural exports increasing much more rapidly.
Price inflation increased by 4 to 5 percentage points in 1992 and 1993. Monetary base also
increased due to increases in international reserves. The net effect is a slight decline in real credit. The
increase in tax revenues offsets the increases in foreign debt payment, leading to practically no change
in real government investments. Real private investments rose by more than 4% in 1993 due to the
increase in international reserves.
Summary and Conclusion
In summary, it is clear that any supply-side macro model for the Philippines, where interventions
in the foreign exchange market are prevalent, must include the quantity variable for foreign exchange
since the exchange rate no longer measures the shadow price of foreign exchange and therefore gives
no indication of the relative scarcity of foreign exchange.
The macro model presented here shows that it is not necessarily true, especially if the resulting
increases in international reserves are used for economic growth, that devaluation is contractionary
because it increases domestic cost of imports. It is important, therefore, that devaluation is not
accompanied by contractionary policies. Other important conclusions drawn from our macro model are
as follows:
1. Credit and Foreign exchange are important supply determinants of output.
2. Price inflation may be significantly higher for periods ,;vhen exchange rate adjustments are
substantial. Given the sizeable resistance to devaluations from many sectors, this may lead to
wrong expectations and instability as happened in 1970 and 1983-1984. It would, therefore, be
wise to cushion the inflationary impact with counter-policies or "safety nets" for fixed income
groups. If the Oil Price Stabilization Fund exhibits high surpluses, it is beneficial to accompany
devaluations with oil price reductions. Food programs for rural areas are also a potential safety
net.
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TabLe 4
Base Run $imu|ation and Deva|uatim Scemario
for 1991 to 1993
kctua[ Base Run _ Diff Base Run $imutated _ DIFF
DevaLuation
Ya
1991 29829 50702 2.93 30702 30702 0.00
" 1992 31496 31496 31430 -0.21
1993 31921 31921 31965 O.14
Yna
1991 79050 79989 1. 19 79989 79989 0. O0
1992 81140 81140 81757 0.76
1993 84688 84688 87845 3.73
========================== =======================
Y
1991 108879 110691 1.66 110691 110691 0.00
1992 112636 112636 113187 0,49
1993 116609 116609 119810 2.74
1991 -0.92 0.73 -179.29 0.73 0.73 0.00
1992 1.76 1.76 2.25 28.32
1993 3.53 3 •53 5.85 65 .90
Ip
1991 13147 15290 16.30 15290 15290 0.00
1992 15753 15753 15807 0.34
1993 17820 17820 18611 4 •44
Ig
1991 2510 2797 11 . 46 2797 2797 O.00
1992 2992 2992 2959 - 1. 10
1993 3136 3136 3122 -0.43
!
1991 15657 18088 15.52 18088 18088 0.00
1992 18745 18745 18766 O.11
1993 20955 20955 21734 3.71
E
1991 27.48 25.61 -6.82 25.61 25.61 0.00
1992 27.26 27.26 29.41 7.87
1993 29.19 29.19 34.59 18.52
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Actua[ Base Run _ Oiff Base Run ${mutated _ DIFF
Devatuation
X$a
1991 NA 756 756 756 0.00
1992 656 656 855 30.31
1_3 603 603 1118 85.44
X$na
1991 NA 7427 7427 7427 0.00
1992 7603 7603 7941 4.45
1993 8122 8122 9331 14.89
========================== =======================
X$
1991 8840 8183 _7.43 8183 8183 0°00
1992 8259 8259 8796 6.51
1993 8724 8724 10449 19.76
MS
1991 12051 11514 -4.46 11514 11514 0.00
1992 12407 12407 12211 -I.58
1993 14020 14020 14011 -0.06
X$-M$
1991 -3211 -3331 3.73 _3331 -3331 0°00
1992 -4148 -4148 -3414 -17.69
1993 -5295 -5295 -3562 -32°7L¢
.................................................
GIR
1991 4470 4350 -2.68 4350 4350 0.00
1992 3891 3891 4625 18.86
1993 2285 2285 4752 107.93
.................................................
.................................................
MB
i991 129363 122392 -5.39 122392 122392 0.00
1992 135239' 135239 137106 1.38
1993 148579 148579 154798 4.19
TL
1991 347079 353289 1.79 353289 353289 0.00
1992 391171 391171 393059 0.48
1993 432326 432326 439998 1.77
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Actual Base Run X Diff Base Run Simulated X DIFF
Devaluation
TL/P
1991 28981 29961 3,38 29961 29961 0.00
1992 30504 30504 29752 -2.47
1993 30433 30433 28837 -5.25
1991 16.49 14.69 -I0.90 14.69 14.69 0.00
1992 8.75 8.75 12.04 37.5?
1993 10.78 10.78 15.49 43.74
1991 220800 217303 -1.58 217303 217303 0.00
1992 232869 232869 241691 3.79
1993 258453 258453 287593 11.27
CPSD
1991 29900 29870 o0.10 29870 29870 0.00
1992 47187 47187 48831 3.49
1993 53966 53966 59429 I0.12
26
3. Mainly because of the higher price inflation, credit availability in real terms may decline
although not substantial because of the automatic increase in monetary base due to the
subsequent increase in international reserves. But monetary authorities should make sure that
the required credit to finance the expected higher growth brought about by exchange rate
adjustments is available. Whether there is a tradeoff with even higher inflation would of course
depend on whether the economy exhibits high capacity utilization or not.
4. Our simulations show that expected increases in national government foreign debt servicing due
to devaluations are offset by increases in revenues due to higher output and income and due to
a higher peso value for imports. The fiscal constraint, therefore, unduly worsened. Our study,
however, underestimates the impact of devaluations on foreign debt servicing for it does not
include the increase in foreign debt servicing due to the Central Bank debt as we are unable to
acquire the inability to get the breakdown of the Central Bank deficit figure broken down into
domestic and foreign components.
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Appendix A
Estimating the Elasticity of Substitution
in Demand Between Imported and Domestic Goods and
the ELasticity of Transformation in Supply Betueen
Export and Domestic Goods
1. Ln (H/D) = -0.5070 + .8704 tn (Pd/eP_)  .5335In (H/D). 1
(-1.8086)*** (3.1014)* (2.4378)**
R2 = .8589 F = 33.47**
2. tn (X/D) = 9.1318 + 1.1263 In (eP_P d) - 0.9515 Ln (K) + 0.1023 TIHE + JAR(l) = -0.5616]
(3.9901.)* (2.4554)** (-4.9999)* (9.8953)* ('1.8326)***
R2 = ,9621 F = 50.82*
where,
N = real value of imports (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
X = real value of exports (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
D = real value of domestic goods (in million pesos, 1972 prices)
eP; = peso price index of imports (1972 base year)
eP_ = peso price index of exports (1972 base year)
Pd = price index of domestic goods (1972 base year)
K = capital utilization
TINE = year
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